Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection by De Feo, G. & Hindriks, J.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
De Feo, G. and Hindriks, J. (2005) Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse
selection. Discussion paper. Département des Sciences Économiques de l’Université catholique
de Louvain Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
 
 
De Feo, G. and Hindriks, J. (2005) Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse 
selection. Discussion Paper. Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université catholique de 
Louvain Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
 
 
 
 
 
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/5395/
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University 
of Strathclyde. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in 
further distribution of the material for any profitmaking activities or any commercial 
gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) and the 
content of this paper for research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes 
without prior permission or charge. You may freely distribute the url 
(http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) of the Strathprints website. 
 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to The 
Strathprints Administrator: eprints@cis.strath.ac.uk 
 
E¢ ciency of Competition in
Insurance Markets with Adverse
Selection
Giuseppe De Feo
CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain and University of
Napoli "Federico II"
Jean Hindriks
CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
July 2005
Abstract: There is a general presumption that competition is a good
thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets
can be bad when there is adverse selection. Using the dual theory of
choice under risk, we are able to fully characterize both the competitive
and the monopoly market outcomes. When there are two types of risk,
the monopoly dominates competition if and only if competition leads to
market unravelling. When there are a continuum of types the e¢ ciency
of competition is less trivial. In e¤ect monopoly is shown to provide
better insurance but at the cost of driving out some agents from the
market. Performing simulation for di¤erent distributions of risk, we nd
that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in
terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in
equilibrium. The reason is that the monopolist can exploit its market
power to relax the incentive constraints.
Keywords: monopoly, competition, non-expected utility, insurance, ad-
verse selection.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
In this paper we address the critical question: how and how well do
competition on the markets handle the fundamental problems of infor-
mation. With imperfect information, market actions or choices convey
information and we know from earlier work (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976) that existence problems can arise in competitive markets because
the slight change in the action of the informed side of the market dis-
cretely changes beliefs of the other side of the market. While information
asymmetries inevitably arise, the extent to which they do so and their
consequences on the realization of the gains from trade depend on the
how the market is structured. This raises the fundamental question of
the interplay between two forms of market imperfections: imperfect in-
formation and imperfect competition. There is no particular reason why
competition should be better in the presence of imperfect information.
The simplest way by which this would not be true is when the rm could
exploit its market power to relax the incentive constraints.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the e¢ ciency of competition
on the insurance market in the presence of adverse selection. Using the
benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we contrast the com-
petitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilibrium outcome
à la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative e¢ ciency. Following
Rustichini et al (1994), the (expected) e¢ ciency of an equilibrium is the
fraction whose numerator is the expected gains from trade across all
traders in the equilibrium and whose denominator is the expected gains
from trade across all traders with full information. Using this criterion
we compare the monopoly outcome with one seller of insurance contracts
and many potential buyers with di¤erent risks against the competitive
outcome imposing zero prot on each contract that might be o¤ered in
equilibrium. To deal with the possible non-existence of a competitive
equilibrium à la Rothschild Stiglitz with a continuum of types (Riley,
2001) we refer to the concept of reactive equilibrium developed by Riley
(1979) and Engers and Fernandez (1987) for which the Pareto-dominant
full separating zero-prot outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium.
It is well known that models describing the e¤ect of asymmetric in-
formation on the market performance can be distinguished according to
how they model the market mechanism and how they dene a market
outcome. The conclusions then turn out to be very sensitive to minor
modelling changes. To handle this di¢ culty we choose not to model a
particular market mechanism but rather take the fundamental feature of
all market mechanisms, voluntary participation in trade and the incen-
tive constraints, and apply the revelation principle to study the relative
e¢ ciency of competition.
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Our paper continues a line of research begun by Stiglitz (1977), who
analyzed monopoly insurance mostly with two types of agent with ex-
pected utility, and compared the equilibrium outcome with the (two-
type) competitive outcome. However his comparison analysis did not
come out neatly when dealing with a continuum of types. Dalhby (1987)
studies the same issue in a two-type insurance model with expected util-
ity, but again without using the expected e¢ ciency criterion to compare
competition and monopoly. We perform this analysis in a non-expected
utility approach and with a continuum of risks. It turns out that by
using the dual theory approach of Yaari (1987), we are able to provide
a clearcut comparison between monopoly and competition.
The dual theory has the property that utility is linear in income, and
risk aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of probabilities in
which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights and good out-
comes are given relatively lower weights. In our simple two-state model
the probability of bad outcome is weighted up by a loading factor. As
we shall see this formulation of risk aversion without diminishing mar-
ginal utility allows the derivation of a rich set of insights. Although most
of the classical results in insurance theory appear to be robust to such
departures from the expected utility model, one important implication
to the demand of insurance deserves to be emphasized and will play
a major role in the rest of the analysis: under the dual theory, a risk
averse individual has constant marginal willingness to pay for insurance
whereas under expected utility a risk averse individual has decreasing
marginal willingness to pay.1 A related key di¤erence is about the order
of risk aversion.2When risk aversion is of order 1 as in the DT, it could
be optimal for a policyholder to buy full insurance even above the fair
price. This is because he derives positive benets from the last dollar of
coverage. By contrast under EU, risk aversion is of the second order and
the benet from the last dollar of coverage is zero. Therefore nobody
would nd protable to buy complete insurance slightly above fair price
in the EU model eventhough this is common practice.3
Recently some works by Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) and Chas-
sagnon and Villeneuve (2005) deal with a seemingly related argument:
the insurance market under adverse selection with subjective risk per-
ception. In these works, risk aversion is still expressed by the decreasing
1Fortunately, as shown in Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) and Machina (1989,
1995) many of the implications of expected utility theory for the optimal insurance
design carry over to the non-expected utility approach.
2For the denition of the order of risk aversion, see Segal and Spivak (1990). An
excellent survey of the various denitions of risk aversion is provided in Cohen (1995).
3See Mossin (1968).
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marginal utility of wealth, but probabilities are modied in the expected
utility function according to a subjective perception. In the monopolist
framework with two types a rich set of equilibrium allocation is dened,
depending on the relative perception of the risk of the two types.4 Among
these results, a pooling equilibrium is a possible outcome, just as in our
paper, essentially for the same reason: the order of risk aversion. The
second best allocation with two types di¤ers from our results (see Section
3).5 Indeed, by allowing for overinsurance and restricting the analysis
to utility function with smooth indi¤erence curves (no kink at full
coverage) they show that there is no positive prots in the second best
allocation, and that there is no pooling contract with full coverage in the
second best. These conclusions rest heavily on the fact that the no-kink
assumption implies that pessimistic types, that have a perception of
the risk higher than reality, prefer risky outcomes (with over-insurance)
to sure outcome (with full insurance). Moreover this approach is not
appropriate for our welfare analysis. The fact that agents make mistake
in their perception of the risk makes the welfare analysis of competition
potentially misleading (i.e. should we take into account such mispercep-
tion of risk when comparing competitive outcome versus the monopoly
outcome?).
It would be absurd to suggest that the dual theory provides a better
model than the expected utility. The latter has obvious appeal and
has provided so many useful results in insurance theory. Nonetheless,
we feel there is some gain from studying the properties of our simple
non-expected utility model, even if only to derive some clear insights on
the e¢ ciency of competition in the presence of adverse selection. Indeed
another distinctive property of insurance under DT is that the demand of
insurance cannot decrease with wealth. In contrast the EU model makes
the comparison between competition and monopoly di¢ cult since by
charging a higher premium (relative to competition) for a given coverage
the monopoly increases the marginal willingness to pay for insurance.6
As a result Dahlby (1987) showed that equilibrium coverage can be either
higher or lower in a monopoly.
The key nding is that the monopoly outcome, in general, is more e¢ -
cient than the competitive outcome (according to our expected e¢ ciency
criterion). The reason why monopoly performs better than competition
is that the monopolists can exploit its market power to o¤er contracts
that better satisfy the incentive constraints. More precisely, the monopo-
4Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004).
5Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005).
6Dahlby (1987) shows that the marginal willingness to pay for insurance is a
decreasing function of wealth when the absolute risk aversion is decreasing.
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list can o¤er contracts with implicit transfers across agent types that can
relax the incentive constraints and implement a larger set of allocations.
This is one of many examples of the interplay between market imper-
fections (see Stiglitz 1975 and Ja¤ee and Stiglitz 1990). The economy,
in e¤ect has to trade o¤ between two di¤erent imperfections: imperfec-
tions of information or imperfections of competition, with no particular
reason that these imperfections will be balanced optimally.
Our main nding about the ine¢ ciency of competition has to be con-
trasted with recent work on the (asymptotic) e¢ ciency of competition
based on the idea that asymmetry in agents information is relatively
unimportant in a large economy (obtained by a replication process) be-
cause any single agent has only a small amount of information not known
by the other agents.7 This is the notion of informational smallness. As
Gul and Postlewaite noted, this result holds in private value informa-
tion problems in which agents have private information that is of direct
relevance only to themselves (i.e. the agentsutility functions depend
only on their own type). This is obviously not the case for the insurance
problem (and for the adverse selection problem in general). Indeed in
our insurance problem with a continuum of types it might seem that
each agent is informationally small and yet the market outcome is very
far from the full information outcome. The reason is that each agent
remains informationally large in this context. Muthoo and Mutuswami
(2005) obtain a similar result for the lemonsmarkets. They show that
e¢ ciency is decreasing in the degree of market competition (measured
by the number of sellers, xing the number of buyers). The driving force
for their result is di¤erent however. They show that rst-best surplus is
increasing in the number of sellers (of either high or low quality good)
but the realized market surplus is unchanged. The reason is that, in the
rst-best, the probability of trade with a high quality seller increases
with the number of sellers. In contrast the incentive constraints imply
that the probability with which a high-quality seller will trade cannot be
greater than the probability with which a low quality seller will trade,
which is independent of the number of sellers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 contains the full information equilibrium and e¢ ciency analy-
sis of competitive and monopoly markets in the simple two-type case. In
Section 4 the analysis is extended to the continuum of types and simu-
lation results are provided about the expected e¢ ciency of competitive
and monopoly markets. Section 5 concludes.
7See Gul and Postlewaite (1992), Gresik Satterthwaite (1989), Satterthwaite and
Williams (1989), Rustichini et al (1994).
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2 The model
There are two possible states of the world: the no accidentstate and
the accidentstate. Individuals di¤er only by their probability of acci-
dent, in which case they face a (xed) damage d = 1. There is no moral
hazard since individuals cannot a¤ect their probability of accident which
is xed. There is a continuum of risk in the economy distributed accord-
ing to a cumulative probability function F () with density f() > 0 on
a closed and compact interval  2 ;  (with 0   <  < 1).
Adverse selection is introduced by assuming that individual risk is pri-
vate information, while the distribution of risks is common knowledge.
We model individualsrisk preferences using Yaari (1987)s dual theory
(DT). We rst give a general description of this approach before apply-
ing it to our model. Let wealth X be a random variable distributed over
[x; x] according to the distribution function 	(x). Yaaris representation
of preferences is dual to the expected utility theory (EU) in the sense
that it is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities. Probabilities
are transformed by a function  dened on the distribution function
	(x).8 More precisely, DT preferences over X are given by
V (X) =
Z
x 0(	(x)) d	(x)
where (0) = 0; (1) = 1 and 0(:) > 0. 0(:) are non-negative weights
adding up to one. Attitude towards risk is conveyed entirely by the
shape of (:). Risk aversion is characterized by the concavity of (:),
i.e. 00(:) < 0. In this case, bad outcomes (with low 	(X)) receive
higher weights than good outcomes (with high 	(X)). In other words,
V (X) is the certainty-equivalent of X computed as a weighted average
of outcomes in which bad outcomes are given high weight while good
outcomes are given low weight. Since V (X) is linear in wealth, this
approach separates attitude towards risk from attitude towards wealth.
We now apply DT to our simple two-state setting. For an individual
with wealth w facing a damage d = 1 with probability , insurance
contract with premium  > 0 and coverage rate  2 [0; 1] yields the
random variable X = (w      (1  ); ;w   ; 1  ). We thus dene
the utility associated to this insurance contract as
V (; ; )=()(w      (1  )) + (1  ())(w   )
=w      ()(1  )
8Alternatively this probability transformation function could be dened on the
decumulative distribution function 1 	 such as in Yaari (1987).
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where risk aversion is represented by () >  (and 1  () < 1  ).9
In this paper, we further assume that () = (1+), with 0    1 

(the upper bound guaranteeing that ()  1 8). Making  inde-
pendent of w accords with our desire to disentangle risk aversion from
income and will greatly simplify the analysis. Using this formulation,
type- utility function from insurance contract (; ) is
V (; ; ) = !      (1 + )(1  )
where the utility loss from the residual risk (1   ) is inated by the
markup factor 1+. Now, comparing the utility with insurance against
the utility without insurance we can dene the reservation premium for
each type. This is the premium   ~() that solves
V (; ; )=V (0; 0; )
!      (1 + )(1  )=!   (1 + )
so that the reservation premium of type  for coverage  is:
~(; ) = (1 + )
Moreover the surplus of the agent is dened as the di¤erence between
the reservation price and the price e¤ectively paid:
S(; ; )= ~(; )  
=(1 + )   
Assuming  > 0, with free participation, those agents receiving  < 0
will drop out of the market.
It is straightforward to see that the functions V and S have the
Single-Crossing property in the contract space-(; ), because the mar-
ginal value of coverage is increasing in . This property implies the
Increasing Di¤erence (ID) property.
A function f :    ! R, where ,   R, has Increasing Di¤er-
ences if the di¤erence f(00; )   f(0; ) is increasing in  2  8 00; 0
2  such that 00 > 0.
9Note that in our model with a discrete random variable, risk aversion translates
into the transformation of the discrete density function () >  rather than the
concave transformation of the distribution function 00(	) < 0 as for continuous
random variable. In both cases risk aversion implies that bad outcomes are given
higher weight and good outcomes lower weight.
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The ID property of V and S is due to the fact that these functions
are continuously di¤erentiable on a closed interval  2 [0; 1] with the
cross-derivatives
@2S
@@
=
@2V
@@
= (1 + ) > 0
As a prelude to our analysis we will rst study the two-type case.
This will provide the preliminary insights on the e¢ ciency of competition
in the insurance market.
3 The two-type case
There are two types of risk. A proportion p has risk  and a propor-
tion (1   p) has risk . We derive rst, as a benchmark, the rst-best
allocations. Then we compare this outcome with the competitive and
monopoly insurance outcomes.
3.1 First-best
The rst best solution, when there is no problem of information about
the type of the agent, is easily derived by maximizing the expected
surplus across all traders subject to the participation constraints. The
optimization programme is:
max
(:)0
(:)2[0;1]
(1  p)S     ;    ; + pS ( () ;  () ; ) + 
subject to
(1  p)        + p [ ()   () ]  0 (1)
S ( () ;  () ; ) 0 (2)
S
 

 


; 
 


; 
 0 (3)
Substituting for the surplus functions and the prot functions, the pro-
gramme reduces to:
max
(:)0
(:)2[0;1]
(1  p)    + p () 
subject to
(1  p)        + p [ ()   () ] 0
(1 + )()  () 0
(1 + )()  () 0
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The solution is:

 


=  () = 1

 

 2 ; (1 + ) 
 () 2 [; (1 + ) ]
All the agents are provided with full insurance and the premium charged
denes the way the surplus is split among rms and agents. The rms
get all the surplus when the premia are set equal to the reservation
prices  () = (1 + )  and 
 


= (1 + ) , while the agents get all
the surplus when the premia are set equal to the fair prices  () = 
and 
 


= .
Total surplus in the rst-best is then
W FB = (1  p) + p
3.2 Second-best
The set of second-best allocation (also called constrained Pareto opti-
mum) is characterized by the set of allocations satisfying the Incentive
Compatibility constraints together with the participation constraints.10
It solves the following programme:
max
(:)0
(:)2[0;1]
(1  p)    + p () 
subject to
(1  p)        + p [ ()   () ] 0 (4)
(1 + )()  () 0 (5)
(1 + )()  () 0 (6)
(1 + )()  () (1 + )()  () (7)
(1 + )()  () (1 + )()  () (8)
The participation constraint of high type (6) is implied by (5) and (8) and
can be disregarded. Also following standard argument of no-distortion-
at-the-top, the surplus is maximized for 
 


= 1. The incentive con-
straint of the low type (7) is typically not binding. Using these facts the
optimization programme reduces to
max
();()0
()2[0;1]
(1  p) + p () 
10This is second-best e¢ ciency in the sense of Harris and Townsend (1981) accord-
ing to which an allocation is second-best e¢ cient if it is Pareto optimal within the set
of allocations that are feasible under the incentive constraints and the participation
constraints.
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subject to
(1  p)     + p [ ()   () ] 0 (9)
(1 + )()  () 0 (10)
(1 + )   () (1 + )()  () (11)
The solution to this optimization problem is given in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 There exists p < 1 such that,
 for p < pthe second-best outcome is a separating contract with
 ()<
 


= 1
 ()= (1 + )  () < 
 


=  () + (1 + ) (1   ())
 for p  pthe second-best outcome is a pooling contract with
 ()= 
 


= 1
 ()= 
 

 2 [(1  p)  + p; (1 + ) ]
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 depicts the rst-best and second-best expected surplus as
a function of p, no matter how the surplus is split between agents and
rms. The Second Best coincides with the First Best when the propor-
tion of low risks is su¢ ciently high to sustain a pooling outcome.
3.3 Monopoly
The monopoly maximizes prot subject to the IC and IR constraints of
the two types:
max
()0
()2[0;1]
p [()  ()] + (1  p) ()  ()
subject to (5) ,(6),(7) and (8). Standard result in monopolist screening
problem implies that the Individual Rationality constraint of the low
type, (5), and the Incentive Compatibility constraint of the high type,
(8), are binding. So the IC for the low type (7) is not binding. Moreover,
as in the second-best outcome, the monopoly prot is maximized for

 


= 1. The monopoly outcome is the following.
Proposition 2 In a monopoly insurance market, there exists p < 1
(with p

> p) such that,
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Figure 1: Comparison of the First and Second Best (as a function of p).
 for p < pthe monopoly outcome is a separating contract with
 ()= 0; 
 


= 1
 ()= 0; 
 


= (1 + ) 
 for p  pthe monopoly outcome is a pooling contract with
 ()= 
 


= 1
 ()= 
 


= (1 + ) 
Proof. see Appendix
The interpretation of the threshold p is clear. Consider increasing
the insurance coverage o¤ered to the low type by  (). The net rev-
enue from this type rises by an amount  (). This reduces rev-
enue from the high-type to maintain the schedule incentive compati-
ble. Since the indi¤erence curves are linear, this revenue loss is just
equal to the di¤erence in the slopes of the indi¤erence curves of the
two types times the change in the coverage rate: (1 + )
 
    ().
Weighting these costs and benets of increasing  () by the propor-
tion of each type, we have that it is (weakly) protable if and only if
p   (1  p) (1 + )       0.
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The existence of a pooling monopoly equilibrium is in sharp contrast
to the expected utility result. Indeed, Stiglitz (1977) showed that pooling
equilibria are always dominated by separating equilibria where the low-
risk individuals obtain partial insurance and do not obtain any surplus.
The reason is that expected utility implies that the marginal value of
insurance is equal to the fair price at the full coverage point (i.e., Second-
Order risk aversion). So, starting from a pooling equilibrium with full
coverage, a slight reduction in the coverage with o¤setting reduction
in premium to maintain the low type indi¤erent, does not a¤ect the
prot earned on that type, but it relaxes the incentive constraint on
the high risk and allows the monopolist to extract more of the surplus
from the high risk. With non-expected utility this argument does not
apply because we have a First Order risk aversion. This implies that
the marginal value of insurance is greater than the fair price at the full
coverage point. Because the indi¤erence curve of the low type is steeper
than the fair price, a reduction of the coverage on the low types with
o¤setting reduction of the premium to maintain this type indi¤erent,
will produce a rst-order reduction in prots. If the proportion of low
type is high enough the pooling equilibrium is stable.
3.4 Comparison with competition
In the competitive insurance market, contracts make zero prot. Follow-
ing Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) there exists no pooling equilibrium.
This precludes any cross-subsidization between types as in the monopoly
case. In fact, the competitive equilibrium can be represented by the
following programme in which the surplus for each type is maximized
subject to the IC and IR constraints plus the zero-prot conditions on
each contract, that is:
max
(:)0
(:)2[0;1]
S((); (); ) 8 =; 	
subject to (5) ,(6),(7), (8) and
 ()   () =0 (12)

 

     =0 (13)
A separating equilibrium exists depending on the distribution of
types. In the separating equilibrium, zero-prot conditions (12) and (13)
imply fair price on each contract, so that the participation constraints (5)
and (6) are not binding and only the Incentive Compatibility constraint
(8) is binding,
(1 + )()  () = (1 + )()  ()
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where by (12) and (13)

 


= 
 



 ()=  () 
Using the standard no-distortion-at-the-top argument 
 


= 1, and
substituting back this expression and the fair prices into the incentive
constraint gives the equilibrium coverage rate for the low type,
 () =
 
   + 
The low-type weakly prefers this separating contract to the pooling con-
tract (with full insurance) if
(1 + )    (p + (1  p))   () 
Substituting for  (), we get
p  (1 + )
 
   
(1 + )
 
   +  = p
It is immediately veried that welfare is higher with competition when
this condition is satised. High-risk individuals obtain full coverage at
fair price (which is the full information allocation) and low-risk individ-
uals obtain partial coverage, whereas under monopoly the low-risk indi-
viduals are not able to buy insurance. If this condition does not hold,
the competitive market unravels and the monopoly dominates with the
low-risk individuals being now able to buy full insurance. Thus we have
the following proposition,
Proposition 3 There exists p < 1 (with p > p) such that,
 for p  pthe surplus is higher under competition
 for p > p the surplus is lower under competition.
Figure 2 depicts the competition and the monopoly surplus relative
to the second-best allocation.
The bottom line is that, with two-type, monopoly insurance can dom-
inate competition only if insurance market unravels under competition
(i.e. p > p

). In this case monopoly can in fact provide full insurance to
both types. When the proportion of low type is su¢ ciently small, p < p

,
it pays the monopolist to exclude the low-risk individuals, and compe-
tition dominates by supplying insurance to both low-risk and high-risk
individuals (although di¤erent contracts).
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Figure 2: Comparison of the monopolist equilibria with the competitive
equilibria and the second best (as a function of p).
Before proceeding to the analysis of the continuum case, we ask why
the threshold p is the same with competition and the monopoly. As
argued earlier, with monopoly the threshold p = p equates the ex-
pected revenue gain of increasing coverage to the low-risk individuals
by  (); that is p () against the expected revenue loss on the
high-risk individuals to keep the schedule incentive compatible, which
by linearity is just equal to the di¤erence in the slopes of the indi¤er-
ence curves of the two types times the change in the the coverage rate:
(1  p) (1 + )      ().
With competition the zero-prot condition must hold and the thresh-
old for a separating equilibrium p = p is such that the low-risk indi-
viduals are indi¤erent between the separating contract with partial cov-
erage and a zero-prot pooling contract with full coverage. From the
indi¤erence condition, all the rent that the low-risk-individuals make
with the increased coverage of the pooling contract must be fully ex-
tracted, so the revenue gain is p () which, in order to maintain
zero-prot, has to be equal to the revenue loss on the high-risk individ-
uals (1  p) (1 + )      (). Thus the condition is the same as for
the monopoly.
13
4 Continuum case
4.1 Monopoly
In this section we study the equilibrium outcome of monopoly insurance
with a continuum of risks. The optimization problem of the monopolist
is:
max
();()
Z 

[()  ()]dF ()
subject to
V ((); (); )V (0; 0; ) 8 2 [; ] (14)
V ((); (); )V ((^); (^); ) 8; ^ 2 [; ] (15)
where (14) is the set of participation constraints and (15) denotes the
set of incentive constraints. Analyzing the set (14) we can see that
V ((); (); )  V (0; 0; )
must be binding, for otherwise it would be possible to increase ()
8 >  . This is the classical monopoly result of full rent extraction
at the bottom.11 As a result all the agents with  >  are left with
information rent, and so their participation constraints are not binding.
In the following Proposition the monopolist outcome is summarized.
Proposition 4 In a monopoly insurance market with a continuum of
risk, there exists
 =
1 + 
h()
with h(:) the non-decreasing hazard rate function, such that,
 for  <  the equilibrium contract is
 ()= 0
 ()= 0
 for    the equilibrium contract is
 ()= 1
 ()= (1 + ) 
11See for example La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
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Proof. see Appendix
Therefore the solution is characterized by a (pooling) contract that
o¤ers full coverage to all    with a premium extracting all the surplus
from type  and no insurance to all  < . The equilibrium payo¤ of
type  under monopoly is:
V m()=!   (1 + )  8  
V m()=!   (1 + )  8 < 
Rewriting h() = f()
1 F () the pivotal type solves
f () = (1 + ) (1  F ())
where the LHS is the revenue loss of an increase in  due to the non-
participation of pivotal type and the RHS is the revenue gain from charg-
ing a higher price on all agents above the pivotal type .
4.2 Comparison with competition
It is well known that with a continuum of types a competitive equilibrium
may fail to exist. In fact Riley (2001) showed the general non-existence of
the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. This existence problem can be cir-
cumvented by resorting to the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by
Riley (1979) and developed further by Engers and Fernandez (1987). A
reactive equilibrium is a set of o¤ers such that there exists no protable
deviation by any rm given that other rms can optimally react to this
deviation by o¤ering new contracts. Engers and Fernandez (1987) pro-
vide general conditions, for which the Pareto-dominant full-separating
zero-prot set of contracts is the unique reactive equilibrium outcome.
It turns out that those conditions hold true in our framework.12 The
key element is that rms are deterred to deviate from the full separating
equilibrium by the belief that other rms will react to skim the cream
and make such initial deviation unprotable.
The Pareto-dominant fully separating zero-prot competitive equi-
librium solves
max
(:)0
(:)2[0;1]
S((); (); ) 8 = [; ]
12The conditions for existence and uniqueness of a reactive equilibrium in our
model are: (1) a continuous probability distribution F (); (2) the prot function of
insurance rms is continuous, bounded and non increasing in  and ; (3) V (; ; ) is
continuous on  where  = [0; 1] and  = [; ] with = inff~(; ) :  2 ;
 2 g and  = supf~(; ) :  2 ;  2 g, is stricly decreasing in  and satises
the Single-Crossing property; (4) the contract space is a closed set .
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subject to
V ((); (); )V (0; 0; ) 8 2 [; ] (16)
V ((); (); )V ((^); (^); ) 8; ^ 2 [; ] (17)
 ()   () =0 8 2 [; ] (18)
Following Hindriks and De Donder (2003) the solution involves the fol-
lowing coverage function
c () =
 
=
 1
 2 [0; 1]
So, while in the monopoly everyone above gets full insurance, with
competition only the highest-risk individuals obtain full coverage and
all the other individuals with lower risk obtain partial coverage. On the
other hand everyone below gets no insurance with monopoly, while
they are provided at least with partial coverage in the competitive case.
Figure 3 compares equilibrium coverage with monopoly and competition.
Figure 3: Relative coverage rates under competition and monopoly.
An interesting di¤erence is that the distribution of risk does not
inuence the screening equilibrium in the competitive setting, while it
inuences the equilibrium allocation in a monopoly; this feature, as we
will see shortly, is essential in the comparison of the outcomes.
Turning to competitive prices, each type is charged the fair premium
c () = 
 
=
 1

The payo¤ of type  under competition is:
V c()=!   c ()  (1 + ) (1  c ()) 
=!   (1 + )  +   = 1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The payo¤ of type  under monopoly is:
V m () = !   (1 + )min f; g
Dene the payo¤ di¤erence between competition and monopoly equilib-
rium:
V () = V c()  V m ()
Hence
V ()=
 
=
 1
  0 8 < 
=
 
=
 1
   (1 + ) (   ) 8  
so when    it is not obvious that individuals prefer competition
to monopoly. To see if individuals on average can be better o¤ with
monopoly, we integrate the payo¤ di¤erence over the whole range of
types to obtain the following expression (see Appendix):Z 

V () dF () =
Z 


 
=
 1
 dF ()  (1 + )     
+
1
2
(1 + )

1  F 2 ()
Including the monopolist prot, we can compare the outcomes under
competition and monopoly in terms of total surplus (see Appendix):
W = 
(Z 


 
=
 1
 dF () 
Z 


h
1   = 1 i dF ())
where the rst part measures the benet of competition in terms of better
insurance to those who cannot buy insurance in a monopoly ( < );
and the second part measures the cost of competition in providing only
partial insurance to those who can get full insurance in a monopoly
(  ). The net balance of the two e¤ects depends on the size of the
threshold :
We can easily derive  for a uniform distribution.
f () =
1
    ; F () =
   
    ; h () =
1
   
by denition  =  solves
=
1 + 

1
h ()
=
1 + 

 
   
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Hence
 =
1 + 
1 + 2

In Figure 4 the e¤ect of a change in distribution is depicted: the left
panel shows a negatively skewed Beta distribution, while the right panel
shows a positively skewed Beta distribution. While the coverage rate
under competition is the same, the level of  in the left panel is lower
than in the right panel.
Figure 4: The e¤ect of di¤erent distributions on coverage.
4.3 Numerical simulation
In this section we perform some numerical simulations using Beta dis-
tribution of risks with non-decreasing hazard rate.
We have seen that the risk distribution a¤ects the monopoly outcome
by changing the critical level , while it does not a¤ect the competition
equilibrium outcome.
b
a 1 2 3 5 10 25
1 14.58 7.25 5.27 4.89 16.15 100
2 25.35 15.23 11.76 10.22 16.94 70.19
3 33.65 22.57 18.15 15.50 19.92 56.65
5 45.64 34.62 29.37 25.14 26.24 48.89
10 62.42 53.63 48.53 43.06 39.73 48.83
25 80.36 75.68 72.48 68.15 62.75 60.64
Table 1: Coverage rate under monopoly for various distributions over
risk Beta(a; b), given the parameters  = 0:1,  = 0:3,  = 0:7.
The e¤ect of changing the distribution on the equilibrium monopoly
coverage rate is illustrated in Table 1. In this table a Beta distribution
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(a; b) is used to show that the coverage rate increases with the concentra-
tion of the distribution (i.e., simultaneous increase in a and b). Moreover,
the more positively skewed is the distribution (i.e.,higher a  b > 0) the
higher is the coverage rate.
The relative performance of competition and monopoly is shown in
the following tables. They show the total surplus realized in the com-
petitive and monopoly equilibria as a percentage of the total surplus
under full information. Fixing the degree of risk aversion and the spread
of risks we can compare competition and monopoly for di¤erent Beta
distributions. The key result is that except for the uniform distribution
(a = b = 1) and distributions for which the highest risk is the mode
(b = 1), the monopoly realizes a higher fraction of the gains from trade.
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in
risk aversion. The surplus increases for both competition and monopoly
(due to larger demand for insurance), but the monopoly still signicantly
outperforms competition.
Comparing Table 3 and 4 we see the e¤ect of a reduction in the spread
of risks [; ]. The e¤ect is once again an increase in the surplus of both
competition and monopoly without changing the relative performance.
b
1 2 3 5 10
a mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp
1 19.57 20.42 10.51 6.34 7.75 2.57 6.91 0.71 19.06 0.14
2 30.13 31.18 19.37 12.37 15.34 5.83 13.31 1.85 20.18 0.35
3 37.89 39.02 26.83 17.94 22.14 9.34 19.12 3.32 23.43 0.66
5 48.93 50.09 38.46 27.56 33.32 16.36 29.03 6.88 29.94 1.56
10 64.34 65.45 56.21 44.51 51.47 31.28 46.37 16.86 43.10 4.96
Table 2: Surplus under monopoly and competition as a percentage of
the First Best surplus for various distributions over risk Beta(a; b), given
the parameters  = 0:1,  = 0:3,  = 0:7.
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b
1 2 3 5 10
a mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp
1 44.10 48.29 42.75 31.14 50.10 23.40 89.06 16.69 100 11.81
2 57.77 61.41 54.94 43.52 56.81 33.76 65.22 23.90 84.60 15.55
3 65.50 68.86 62.31 51.83 62.60 41.49 66.64 29.97 78.82 19.07
5 74.37 77.35 71.25 62.61 70.45 52.44 71.38 39.64 77.23 25.46
10 84.09 86.43 81.69 75.74 80.49 67.52 79.66 55.39 80.54 38.15
Table 3: Surplus under monopoly and competition as a percentage of
the First Best surplus for various distributions over risk Beta(a; b), given
the parameters  = 0:3,  = 0:3,  = 0:7.
b
1 2 3 5 10
a mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp
1 56.25 57.64 73.65 43.56 100 37.00 100 30.99 100 26.21
2 67.97 69.55 71.15 55.06 77.16 46.89 87.21 38.26 96.24 30.34
3 74.28 75.99 74.90 62.45 77.63 53.95 83.52 44.10 92.11 34.05
5 81.24 83.00 80.44 71.60 81.09 63.51 83.52 52.95 89.06 40.43
10 88.57 90.10 87.40 82.24 87.02 75.87 87.16 66.24  
Table 4: Surplus under monopoly and competition as a percentage of
the First Best surplus for various distributions over risk Beta(a; b), given
the parameters  = 0:3,  = 0:3,  = 0:5.
5 Conclusions
There is recent work on the (asymptotic) e¢ ciency of competition based
on the idea that asymmetry in agents information is relatively unim-
portant in a large economy (obtained by a replication process) because
any single agent has only a small amount of information not known
by the other agents. This is the notion of informational smallness. As
Gul and Postlewaite noted this result holds in private value informa-
tion problems in which agents have private information that is of direct
relevance only to themselves (i.e. the agentsutility functions depend
only on their own type). This is obviously not the case for the insurance
problem (and for the adverse selection problem in general). Indeed in
our insurance problem with a continuum of types it might seem that
each agent is informationally small and yet the market outcome is very
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far from the full information outcome. The reason is that each agent
remains informationally large in this context.
Using the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we
contrast the competitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equi-
librium outcome à la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative ef-
ciency. The main change is that we adopt the dual theory of risk so
that the comparison comes out neatly. The dual theory has the property
that utility is linear in income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely
by a transformation of probabilities in which bad outcomes are given
relatively higher weights and good outcomes are given relatively lower
weights.
Our main nding is that competition is bad and that the monopoly
outcome in general is more e¢ cient than the competitive outcome (ac-
cording to our expected e¢ ciency criterion dened as the fraction of the
total surplus that is realized by the market). The reason why monopoly
performs better than competition is that the monopolists can exploit
its market power to relax the incentive constrains. This is one of many
examples of the interplay between market imperfections. The economy,
in e¤ect has to trade o¤ between two di¤erent imperfections: imperfec-
tions of information or imperfections of competition, with no particular
reason that these imperfections will be balanced optimally.
We expect our result about the ine¢ ciency of competition in insur-
ance markets with adverse selection to carry over on other markets with
adverse selection like the capital market or the job market. We also plan
to extend this analysis to screening in the higher education market.
There is a nal remark about the use of the dual theory of risk. With
this specication there is no income e¤ect on the demand of insurance.
In contrast, the expected utility approach will raise the demand for in-
surance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market if
the absolute risk aversion is decreasing. This is because monopoly price
is higher than competitive price which reduces income and thus raises
the marginal willingness to pay for insurance. It is then expected that
moving to the expect utility will further increase the amount of insur-
ance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market, thereby
reinforcing our conclusion about the ine¢ ciency of competition.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The optimization program is a linear programme with 3 variables and
7 constraints (when accounting for the 3 nonnegativity constraints). In
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this problem there cannot be a solution with variables equal to zero.13
So excluding the nonnegativity constraints, the search of the solution
amounts to the search of the extreme points among the remaining 4
constraints. From linear programming we know that when the nonnega-
tivity constraints are not binding any basic feasible solution implies that
the number of binding constraints must be equal to the total number of
variables.14 So we must have a solution with three binding constraints.
There are only two possibilities. Either () < 1 and we have a separat-
ing outcome or () = 1 and we have a pooling outcome.
Dene p =   
  < 1.
When p < p, we have a separating outcome with () < 1:
In this case the constraints (9), (10) and (11) are binding. By (10)
 () = (1 + )  ()
and by (11)

 


=  () + (1 + ) (1   ())
Substituting in (9) the solution is
 ()=
(1  p)
(1  p) (1 + )       p

 


=1
 ()=
(1  p) (1 + )
(1  p) (1 + )       p

 


=(1 + ) 
"
(1  p)       p
(1  p) (1 + )       p
#
where  () < 1 for p < p:
Total welfare in the separating case is:
(1  p)
"
(1  p)     
(1  p) (1 + )       p
#
When p  p we have a pooling outcome with () = 1.
13
 


cannot be zero because otherwise (9) would be violated. If  () was equal to
zero, so should be  () for the constraint (10). Moreover either (9) or (11) should be
not binding: so it were always possible to increase  () and to change  () and 
 


so that the constraints are respected and total welfare is increased. For example, if
(11) is binding (9) is not and it is possible to reduce 
 


increasing  () and  ()
without violating the constraints. If (9) is binding (11) is not and it is possible to
increase  () with a fair premium  () without violating the constraints.
14See Chiang (1984).
22
 Either (10) and (11) are binding, and the solution is :
 ()= 
 


= 1
 ()= 
 


= (1 + ) 
where   0 for p  p;
 or (9) and (11) are binding, and the solution is
 ()= 
 


= 1
 ()= 
 


= (1  p)  + p
Moreover, any convex combination of the two pooling solutions is also
a solution, di¤ering only in the premium charged and the division of the
surplus. So any premium (1  p)  + p   () =     (1 + )  is
also a solution. Total welfare in the case of pooling is
p + (1  p)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Substituting the binding constraints (5),(8) and setting 
 


= 1 the
monopoly optimization problem reduces to
max
()2[0;1]
(1  p) + p   (1  p) (1 + )      ()
The solution is
()= 1 if p  (1 + )
 
   
(1 + )
 
   +   p
()= 0 if p < p

In the case of pooling, by the binding constraint (5), the premium is
 () = 
 


= (1 + )  . In the case of separating outcome, only the
high type gets full insurance 
 


= 1 at its reservation price 
 


=
(1 + ) . It is then easily checked that p

> pwhich completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Because the unique binding IR constraint is for the lowest type:
V ((); (); ) = V (0; 0; )
The set of incentive constraints implies that
 2 arg max
^2[;]
V ((^); (^); ) 8 ; ^ 2 [; ]
23
the rst order condition for the type  is:
@V ((^); (^); )
@^
=
@
@^
[!   (1 + )(1  (^))   (^)]
= (1 + )0(^)   0(^) = 0
which evaluated at ^ =  gives the local incentive compatibility condi-
tions (LIC)
(1 + )0()   0() = 0 8  2 [; ] (19)
Moreover, the necessary LIC is also su¢ cient condition when the utility
function V ((^); (^); ) satises the increasing di¤erences property,
@2V ((^); (^); )
@^@
= (1 + )0(^)  0
which requires the coverage to be monotonically increasing 0()  0:
Dene the value function of the maximization problem evaluated at the
truth-telling equilibrium:
U() = V ((); (); ) = !   (1 + )(1  ())   ()
di¤erentiating w.r.t. 
U 0()= (1 + )(1  ()) + (1 + )0()   0()
= (1 + )(1  ()) < 0
where the second equality follows from (19).
Using these results we can rewrite the maximization programme of
the monopolist as follows:
max
();()
Z 

[()  ()]dF ()
subject to
0() 0
(1 + )0()   0() = 0
V ((); (); )V (0; 0; )
Ignoring for the moment the monotonicity constraint that will be checked
later, we can rewrite the objective function after substituting the con-
straint in it. From the denition of the value function
() = !   (1 + )(1  ())   U() (20)
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and
U()=U() +
Z 

 (1 + )(1  (s))ds
=!   (1 + )   (1 + )(   ) +
Z 

(1 + )(s)ds
=!   (1 + ) +
Z 

(1 + )(s)ds (21)
Substituting this expression into (20):
()=!   (1 + )(1  ())   ! + (1 + )  
Z 

(1 + )(s)ds
=(1 + )()  
Z 

(1 + )(s)ds (22)
This expression for the insurance premium captures the incentive and
participation constraints. Plugging this premium in the objective func-
tion we get the reduced problem:
max
()
Z 


(1 + )()   ()  
Z 

(1 + )(s)ds

dF ()
The second term is the aggregate informational rent which integrating
by parts is given byZ 

Z 

(1+)(s)dsdF () =
Z 

(1 + )(s)dsF ()


 
Z 

(1+)()F ()d
with Z 

(1 + )(s)ds=0
F ()= 0
F ()= 1
Hence:Z 

Z 

(1 + )(s)dsdF ()=
Z 

(1 + )()d  
Z 

(1 + )()F ()d
=
Z 

1  F ()
f()
(1 + )()dF ()
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Plugging the solution for the informational rent into the objective func-
tion
max
()2[0;1]
Z 


 ()    1  F ()
f ()
(1 + )  ()

dF ()
Let h() = f()
1 F () be the hazard rate, then the monopoly programme is
max
()2[0;1]
Z 


 ()    (1 + )
h ()
 ()

dF ()
Because the objective is maximized when the argument of the integral
is maximized 8 2 [; ] the result of Proposition 4 is obtained.
It remains to check the monotonicity constraint. To be veried, it
requires that
@2
@()@

 ()    (1 + )
h ()
 ()

 0
This condition can be expressed in terms of the hazard rate
h0()
h2()
   
1 + 
A su¢ cient condition is that the hazard rate is non-decreasing in the
interval [; ] which completes the proof.
Welfare comparison in the continuum case.
Integrating the payo¤ di¤erence over the whole range of typesZ 

V ()dF ()=
Z 

n

 
=
 1
   (1 + ) [  min (; )]
o
dF ()
=
Z 


 
=
 1
 dF () 
Z 

(1 + ) dF ()
+
Z 

(1 + ) dF () +
Z 

(1 + ) dF ()
=
Z 


 
=
 1
 dF () 
Z 

(1 + ) dF ()
+
Z 

(1 + ) dF ()
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whereZ 

(1 + ) dF ()= (1 + )  [1  F ()]Z 

(1 + ) dF ()= (1 + ) [F ()]   (1 + )
Z 

F () d
=(1 + )    (1 + ) F ()  1
2
(1 + )

1  F 2 ()
which reduces toZ 

V () dF () =
Z 


 
=
 1
 dF ()
  (1 + )     + 1
2
(1 + )

1  F 2 ()
In order to carry out the e¢ ciency comparison we dene the aggre-
gate di¤erence in consumer and producer surplus in the competitive and
monopoly cases :
W =
Z 

V () dF () 
Z 

((1 + )    ) dF ()
=
Z 


 
=
 1
 dF () 
Z 

(1 + ) dF ()
+
Z 

(1 + ) dF () 
Z 

(1 + ) dF () +
Z 

dF ()
=
Z 


 
=
 1
 dF () 
Z 

dF ()
= 
(Z 


 
=
 1
 dF () 
Z 


h
1   = 1 i dF ())
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